🔗 Share this article

At the start of December, the U.S. President brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a truce. He promised an end to years of warfare in the turbulent eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting approach to conflict emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, targeting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President stated, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Change of Direction

This contrast highlights the core tenet of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a moving away from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on economic deals and stopping hostilities—though how this fits with the emerging military strikes in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a top U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration representative reinforced this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Inconsistencies

This shift is major, but analysts note it is premature to assess its effects. The approach is influenced by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained an analyst for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis predicts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Tensions

Unlike his immediate predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous comment on African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable disagreement has developed with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Diplomacy and Targeted Involvement

A comparable tension appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the harsh rhetoric may have pushed the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Some analysts see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the revised strategy likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.